Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence - U.D.I.

Ian Smith, who was elected to pursue independence for
South Rhodesia - with or without Britain's consent.

As the winds of change blew over the African continent, the United Kingdom began the process of decolonisation in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. The process in many territories was not without controversy; involving a brutal war in Kenya, the implementation of hasty and unilateral federal arrangements in Nigeria, the slapping together of British Cameroons with a neighbouring French colony, and fleeting attempts to deny popular leaders power in soon-to-be nations from Ghana to Botswana. However, perhaps the most traumatic and thoroughly botched decolonisation effort was undertaken in Southern Rhodesia.

A hard-line Rhodesian Front government came to power in 1964, under Ian Smith. Ian Smith’s government almost immediately set about trying to demonstrate their right to constitute an independent state as Ian Smith himself elaborated upon in his autobiography: The government held a referendum for the almost wholly-white electorate which endorsed independence by a wide margin, and an ‘indaba’ was held among the country’s many indigenous chiefs which unanimously endorsed independence on the Rhodesian Front’s terms.

Note that the African population was not afforded a referendum. The African population was regarded in quite contradictory manners by the government, press and white society in general in Rhodesia: They were treated with fear and suspicion, with the number of Africans considered “civilised” always being very small. But what was interesting is that there existed a parallel impression of the black population: Throughout the period the African “masses” were considered benign, simple, and thoroughly uninterested in equality with whites (black nationalism invariably considered by the Smith government as a foreign import by malicious neighbours). Keeping with this impression, the Rhodesian government sought to operate through tribal leaders - ostensibly seen as the natural representative of a population that couldn’t understand or were not interested in democratic participation. The fact that the tribal leaders were far more easily manipulated, and often served at the government’s beck-and-call oughtn’t surprise anyone.

These failed to convince Westminster, neither were they convinced by the subsequent negotiations, which failed to reach consensus on the issue of the black majority in Southern Rhodesia. The negotiations having gone nowhere, Smith's government issued U.D.I. in 1965: Detractors maintained this was ultimately to preserve white minority rule. Smith for his part rejected this to his dying day, maintaining that Rhodesia's economy could only improve when independent, which would benefit all people living there - and citing Congo as an example of majority-rule that made blacks worse off.

The newly-independent Rhodesia's race relations were nuanced
and complex, as the black majority were on occasion viewed as
unproblematic - provided they remained essentially apolitical.

U.D.I. inaugurated a fascinating period in African history wherein the two-track understanding (or lack thereof) of blacks as at once a latent threat and a benign, passive element within Rhodesian society provides a more nuanced form of what one might call White Supremacy than that which existed in, say, South Africa or the American South.

However, it also had-far reaching effects globally. It spurred the U.N.’s first-ever sanctions - with Rhodesia now forming a key case study into the efficacy of sanctions in geopolitics - and revived the Commonwealth: Now dominated by newly-decolonised states, the Commonwealth had once looked to be the last breath of empire but following U.D.I. was imbued with a new, relevant purpose as a vehicle for African states to air their grievances and have them heard: On Rhodesia, and later on South Africa and other concerns. - DANIEL A. RUSSELL

SOURCES:

·       Anglin, Douglas G., Unilateral Independence in Southern Rhodesia, International Journal Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn, 1964).

·       Cousins, Alan, State, Ideology, and Power in Rhodesia, 1958-1972, The International Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 24, No. 1 (1991).

·       Fraser, Malcolm, The Effectiveness of the Commonwealth, RSA Journal Vol. 138, No. 5402 (January 1990).

·       Hovi, Jon; Huseby, Robert and Sprinz, Detlef F., When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?, World Politics Vol. 57, No. 4 (Jul., 2005).

·       Marshall, H. H., The Legal Effects of U. D. I. (Based on Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke), The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 1968).

·       Minter, William and Schmidt, Elizabeth, When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Reexamined, African Affairs Vol. 87, No. 347 (Apr., 1988).

·       Smith, Ian D., Southern Rhodesia and Its Future, African Affairs Vol. 63, No. 250 (Jan., 1964).

·       Smith, Ian, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of its Independence, (London: John Blake Publishing Ltd., 2008).