The Cuban Missile Crisis

Missile Crisis of 62’ 

It was on 16^th October 1962 that the Cuban Missile crisis exploded with a vengeance, bringing the world incredibly close to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon. An event of canonical status, the crisis that erupted brought into question the interrelationship of the United States and the Soviet Union, effectively leading the superpowers of the globe to a direct confrontation.[1]

President John F. Kennedy, upon discovering the undisclosed installation of medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba, believed that the chances of the situation suddenly escalating to war was ‘between 1 in 3 and even’.[2]With the advancement of missiles powerful enough to deliver a substantial nuclear explosion, tensions quickly intensified.

The transportation of these missiles had been directed on the orders of the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in a direct attempt to substantiate the previous Soviet claim of strategic missile superiority. It seems that the Soviets had overemphasised their superiority and ownership of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBMs] and instead required lands outside the firing range of the USSR, from which Intermediate range missiles could be hypothetically launched, reaching the United States.[3] With Cuba chosen as the perfect location for the missile base, stakes were extremely high. With hindsight, we know that it was not only missiles being transported into Cuba, but there was also 100 tactical weapons that could be launched.[4]  It seems that had the Soviet plan succeeded, Khrushchev would be in the position to make demands as and when he pleased.[5]

It was on 14^th October 1962 that a lone U-2 plane flew over Cuba, photographing the installation of missiles, only 90 miles from the United States coast. With information being provided to the President on a minutely basis, the ‘intelligence community performed admirably’.[6] In response to the findings, following a week of deliberations, President Kennedy announced the implementation of a Cuban naval blockade around the island, instantly preventing any additional missile shipments.[7]

The second week of negotiations was intense, with neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanting to admit defeat. Primarily played out within the White House, the event lasted for thirteen days, until October 27^th, when the Soviet Premier finally accepted the terms of Kennedys proposal, who promised not to invade Cuba, providing that Khrushchev begin to dismantle and withdraw the missiles.[8]

Today, there are have been many Presidents that have since looked back to the events of 1962, in an attempt to learn from it. With tapes of the National Security Council deliberations, recorded by Kennedy himself, we are able to comprehend and challenge the endless solutions discussed, with the power to suddenly transform the Cold War into an extremely explosive one.[9]

[Bombs in the backyard: the map of Cuba that John F. Kennedy annotated on October 16, 1962, on display at his presidential library][10]

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[1]  Laffey, Mark, and Jutta Weldes. "Decolonizing the Cuban Missile Crisis." International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 555-77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29734251. 

[2] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.

[3] Miller, Linda K., and Mary McAuliffe. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." OAH Magazine of History 8, no. 2 (1994): 24-41. Accessed March 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25162944.

[4] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.

[5] Miller, Linda K., and Mary McAuliffe. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." OAH Magazine of History 8, no. 2 (1994): 24-41. Accessed March 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25162944.

[6] Miller, Linda K., and Mary McAuliffe. "The Cuban Missile Crisis." OAH Magazine of History 8, no. 2 (1994): 24-41. Accessed March 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25162944.

[7] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.

[8] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.

[9] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.

[10] Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 11-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218035.